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INDIRECT TAXATION OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: A QUESTIONABLE
SOURCE OF REVENUE
KARL E. WOLF*
The expenditures of the federal government are greater than one
hundred twenty billion dollars annually,' and federal property holdings
now exceed one-fourth of the nation's land area.' Such federal pur-
chases and land holdings are a possible fertile source of tax revenue
for some state and local governments. This article will discuss the
ramifications of individual states tapping the federal treasury by this
means.
FEDERAL IMMUNITY TODAY
After many years of confusion, the issue of federal immunity
from state taxation has been clarified by a plethora of recent litigation.'
In the sales tax area, a nondiscriminatory tax upon a transaction to
which a federal government instrumentality is a party is permitted,
if the legal incidence of the tax is not upon the federal government'
or its agents.' For example, in 1962, the Supreme Court upheld, per
curiam, the imposition of an Illinois "vendor-type" sales tax upon a
direct sale to the federal government.'
When a contractor for the federal government purchases property
out of state, and title passes directly to him, the state in which the
property is used may impose a nondiscriminatory use tax on such use.'
Whenever title passes directly to the Government, the contractor may
be taxed for his use of such property if the statute taxes use or pos-
session regardless of ownership, as opposed to use incident to owner-
Member Connecticut and District of Columbia Bars, B.S., 1943, United States
Military Academy; LL.B., 1953, University of Pennsylvania; S.J.D., 1963, George
Washington University; Associate Counsel—Government Business, Philco Corporation.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not represent
the views of his employer, or the Department of Defense.
H.R. Doc. No. 15, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1963).
2 General Services Administration, Report of the Interdepartmental Committee for
the Study of Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States (1957).
8
 Wolf, State Taxation of Government Contractors (1964) ; Wolf, State and Local
Taxation (Government Contracts Monograph No. 5, 1962).
4 Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964); United States
v. Department of Revenue, .371 U.S. 21 (1962); Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1
(1941); Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 41 (1940).
5 Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954); United States v. Boyd,
211 Tenn. 139, 363 S.W.2d 193 (1962), aff'd, 84 Sup. Ct. 1518 (1964).
8 United States v. Department of Revenue, supra note 4.
7 Curry v. United States, 314 U.S. 14 (1941).
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ship.' If the contractor is an authorized government agent, he is im-
mune from such use taxes. 9
It is now firmly established that a contractor may be taxed for
the possession or use of federal real or personal property, whether under
a lease or permit, even though the contractor is executing a federal
contract.'° Prior to assessing such a possessory interest tax, the state
legislature must have authorized the imposition.'
Any attempt to discriminate against the federal government by
providing an exemption from sales, use, or possessory interest taxes
for the state, its political subdivisions or its contractors is unlawful."
Exemptions for charities, religious organizations, and educational
institutions are allowed."
From this capsule summary it is evident that by skillfully de-
signing its tax statutes a state may legally tax purchases by the federal
government and by a federal contractor as well as tax the latter's use or
possession of federal property. The ramifications of a state indirectly
taxing the federal government in this manner are many and varied.
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS
Although there is no specific prohibition in the United States
Constitution against state taxation of the instrumentalities, property,
and operations of the United States, the courts have generally implied
such immunity from the supremacy clause. As early as McCulloch v.
Maryland" the Supreme Court recognized that when a state taxed
the operations of the federal government, it acted upon institutions
created not merely by its own inhabitants but by others, over whom
it could claim no control. The nature of such taxation thus becomes
United States v. Boyd, supra note 5. See Hallett Constr. Co. v. South Dakota,
119 N.W.2d 117 (S.D. 1963). Compare Chrysler Corp. v. City of New Orleans, 238 La.
123, 114 So. 2d 579 (1959); Avco Mfg. Corp. v. Connelly, 145 Conn. 161, 140 A.2d 479
(1958); General Motors Corp. v. State Comm'n of Revenue & Taxation, 182 Kan. 237.
320 P.2d 807 (1958); Tawes v. Aerie! Prods., Inc., 210 Md. 627, 124 A.2d 805 (1956).
9
 United States v. Livingston, 179 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. S.C. 1959), aff'd, 364 U.S. 281
(1960). Cf. United States v. Boyd, supra note 5.
1° City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958); United States v. Town-
ship of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958); United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466
(1958).
11
 Ford Motor Co. v. Korzen, 196 N.E.2d 656 (III. 1964); Continental Motors Corp.
v. Township of Muskegon, 365 Mich. 191, 112 N.W.2d 429 (1961); Martin Co. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 225 Md. 404, 171 A.2d 479 (1961); General Dynamics Corp. v. County
of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 59, 330 P.2d 794 (1958).
18 United States v. Department of Revenue, supra note 4; Phillips Chem. Co. v.
Dumas Independent School Dist., 361 U.S. 376 (1960). See Comptroller v. Pittsburgh-
Des Moines Steel Co., 231 Md. 132, 189 A.2d 107 (1963); Knapp-Stiles, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Revenue, 370 Mich. 629, 122 N.W.2d 642 (1963).
13
 United States v. Department of Revenue, supra note 4.
14
 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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an action by a part against the whole under a policy in which the whole
is unrepresented.
A. Reasons Supporting the Removal of Federal Immunity
The financial plight of the states has become increasingly acute;
one cannot deny that federal immunity has intensified the problem.
Given this financial situation, those who advocate increased state
taxation of the federal government generally employ the following
arguments. First, they contend that when state and local governments
are involved, the federal government should pay its way. Second, they
argue that every state should share in the added financial burden
imposed on a single state when defense contractors perform govern-
ment contracts in the furtherance of national defense. Finally, they
suggest that local communities should be permitted to recover for
losses in tax revenues caused when federal ownership of property
reduces the tax base while still requiring the expenditure of local funds
to provide essential services."
B. Arguments for the Maintenance of Federal Immunity
Let us consider in detail the answers to these propositions that are
most frequently advanced by the federal government. First, it is argued
that an examination of federal expenditures which aid state and
local governments. indicates that the federal government does pay
its way. In fiscal 1964 federal financial assistance to state and local
governments totaled approximately ten and a half billion dollars."
This figure does not include substantial expenditures which contribute
to state and local coffers in the form of state and local taxes paid
directly or indirectly as a result of other federal expenditures, including
a forty-seven billion dollar defense budget." Since over 10% of the
federal budget goes to aiding state and local governments, there is a
basis for the federal government's argument. One weakness in this
position is, however, that the states being thus aided may very well
not be the states being hurt by federal immunity.
Second, let us consider whether those states which do not benefit
by having defense contractors located within their borders should
contribute to the payment of added sums resulting from local taxation
of sales to the federal government. It is argued on the federal side
that there is little to support such payments by the other states, since
only the taxing state is benefited, although indirectly, by the presence
of those defense contractors. The attempts by governors and other state
15 Groves, Tax Immunities on Federal Property, 1959 Wis. L. Rev. 167 (1959);
Pierce, Tax Immunity Should Not Mean Tax Inequity, 1959 Wis. L. Rev. 173 (1959).
16 H.R. Doc. No. 15, supra note 1, at 405.
17 Federal Publications, The Government Contractor, IT 474 (1963).
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officials to increase both the number of defense contractors located in
the state and the amount of contract awards to those contractors
is pointed to as an indication of the benefits which the states derive
from such activities. 18
 If defense contractors are such a burden to
a state, it would be difficult to explain this intense desire on the part
of state officials to increase the burden.
Third, some writers have similarly indicated that the argument
that federal ownership is mostly a burden to local governments, which
should be shared, is inconsistent with the strong pressure brought to
bear by local interests either for the location of large military facilities
in their community or against the termination of industrial type work
being performed at nearby government facilities." Others have pointed
out that unless payments by the federal government are limited to
situations of demonstrable hardship, payments to rural communities
situated near some self-contained government installations may result
in an undeserved windfall to those local communities while the entire
nation is footing the bill. For example, a possessory interest tax imposed
upon an Atomic Energy Commission contractor at Oak Ridge, Ten-
nessee, for his possession of two billion dollars worth of federal govern-
ment property probably would eliminate the need of the local juris-
diction for any other tax revenues. A state which was unsuccessful
in its attempts to secure the location of a new government installation
within its borders would likely feel much less than joyful if it had to
present this bonanza to the successful state in the form of payments
from its citizens' federal tax money. Such payments would appear to
provide the favored states with additional favors at the expense of
the less favored.
EFFECT OF STATE TAXATION OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The Government, being required by regulation to get the most
for the taxpayer's money, must let a contract for supplies to that
responsible bidder or offeror submitting the lowest responsive bid
or proposal. A contractor must adjust his prices to include all state
taxes he is forced to pay because the contract clauses require that
applicable taxes be included in the prices quoted. This factor becomes
particularly important when that contractor is involved in the close
competition which exists in both advertised as well as negotiated
procurements. A spread of only one or two per cent between the lowest
and next lowest bid in multi-million dollar defense procurements is
18 The Evening Star (Wash. D.C.), Jan. 1, 1962, p. B-3; The Evening Bulletin
(Phila.), Sept. 11, 1963, p. 57.
19 Van Cleve, States' Rights and Federal Solvency, 1959 Wis. L. Rev. 190 (1959) ;
The Evening Bulletin (Phila.), Aug. 22, 1964, p. 1, col. 5.
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now the rule rather than the exception. Contractors who must pay
taxes on their materials and end products sold to the Government or
on government-owned machinery and property in their possession or
use under government contracts are not in as strong a competitive posi-
tion as contractors in states which do not impose such taxes. Placing
a contractor in this disadvantageous competitive position may make
his state less attractive as a site for industrial expansion and contribute
to the loss of business by firms located in the state. A favorable tax
climate is a significant consideration in deciding into which state a
large corporation will expand or in which of its plants in the different
states it will perform its contracts.
The effect of an adverse tax climate upon government con-
tractors has been clearly demonstrated in Illinois. Illinois was involved
in extensive litigation in both the federal and state courts over the
right of a state to tax direct sales to the federal government. In October,
1962, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the right of Illinois
to impose a vendor type sales tax upon direct sales to the federal
government while simultaneously exempting sales to charities, religious
and educational institutions but not sales to state and local govern-
ments.20
 Within six months of the decision, the Illinois legislature
amended its statutes to provide an exemption for sales to the federal
government. The legislature justified its enactment by specifically
stating in the statute that:
... [T]he imposing of the retailers' occupation tax on the
proceeds from sales to the Federal Government is driving
business out of Illinois by encouraging purchasing Federal
Government agencies to make their purchases of tangible
personal property outside Illinois."
A sales or use tax imposed upon the purchase of construction
materials by construction contractors of the federal government
becomes an important factor in deciding where to build costly federal
facilities, such as a service academy, a new research plant, or a
nuclear reactor. A four or five per cent sales or use tax payable in
one state on the materials incorporated in such a structure would mean
that the Government would get less for its money in such a state than
in a state where no such tax was levied. Thus, if there are two or
more possible sites, and all other factors are substantially equal, the
additional four or five per cent cost of placing an installation in a
state where such a tax is imposed upon materials incorporated in the
project may well be the deciding factor against locating in that state. 22
20 United States v. Department of Revenue, supra, note 4.
21
 S.B. 444, Ill. Laws 1963, March 21, 1963.
22 In comparison, it is interesting to note that in Colorado, which has one of the
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In selecting a site for a new government facility which is to be
contractor operated, the Government must consider whether reim-
bursement to the contractor will be required because of state possessory
interest taxes. Otherwise, it would mean that each year the Government
would get less for its money in a state imposing such taxes, as com-
pared to a state where no such tax had to be paid.
If the federal government is to be subjected to state taxation
indirectly by vendor type sales. taxes and possessory interest taxes, it
is clear that the added cost of close to a billion dollars yearly will
have to come from additional federal tax revenues. The federal govern-
ment may take the position that the way to raise the federal funds
to pay for these added tax burdens is to remove those intergovern-
mental tax immunities which benefit state and local governments at
the expense of the federal treasury. One solution which has been sug-
gested is the removal of the income tax exemption for the interest from
bonds and securities issued by those municipalities which prefer to
impose possessory interest type taxes upon the holders of government
property." A second remedy may be to remove the exemption from
Federal Manufacturers and Retailers Excise Taxes currently pro-
vided where the product is sold to a state government.' Of course, an
obvious additional answer would be to reduce federal grants to those
states indirectly taxing the federal government.
DEVICES AVAILABLE TO FEDERAL AGENCIES
The federal government is now showing considerable sophistica-
tion in avoiding the payment of state and local taxes." Several avenues
are presently available to the federal government to reduce the state
and local tax burden.
The title passing provisions of the progress payments" and gov-
ernment property clauses" authorized for use in defense contracts
by procurement regulations can and do reduce sales and use tax ex-
posure. These two title vesting clauses provide for passage of title
directly to the Government from the vendor without title ever vesting
in the contractor. If title never vests in the contractor on his purchases
covered by the contract, neither a state sales tax imposed upon a
most favorable sales and use tax climates for government contractors, the dollar amount
of defense contract awards to contractors located within that state has increased 176
per cent over the past five years.
25
 Van Cleve, supra note 19.
24
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4055.
25
 Wolf, Reducing State and Local Tax Costs to Compete More Effectively for
Government Contracts, 1962 Mil. L. Rev. 35 (1962).
26
 ASPR, 32 C.F.R., app. E, §§ 510.1, 510.2 (1961); Wolf, State Taxation of Gov-
ernment Contractors, supra note 3, at 297.
27
 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 13.503 (1960).
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transfer of title of tangible personal property for a consideration nor
a state use tax imposed upon use incident to ownership can be applied
to such purchases by the contractor.
Some sales and use tax payments can be eliminated by designating
the place and method of delivery of supplies to take advantage of
interstate commerce exemptions. The choice of a government or com-
mercial bill of lading further strengthens the Government's hand in
this regard.
By clearly designating a contractor an agent of the federal govern-
ment, the government departments may be able to clothe their contrac-
tors with the same federal immunity from state taxation which the
Government possesses. The United States Supreme Court in the Kern-
Limerick case" held that a contractor who was designated an agent of
the federal government was entitled to federal immunity from state
taxation. By a similar appointment in a contract, the federal procure-
ment officials may well be able to establish this immunity.
In Paul v. United States," involving minimum milk price laws,
the Supreme Court recognized the ability of federal agencies to issue a
regulation covering the manner in which supplies would be procured
and thereby make ineffective state laws concerning such procurements.
Under the theory upon which that case was decided, it would be pos-
sible for government agencies to provide in their procurement regula-
tions that supplies should be procured without the payment of state and
local taxes imposed upon sales to the Government. Assuming this
interpretation of the Paul case is followed, the application of state sales
and use taxes to such sales to the federal government may be precluded.
Another approach available to the federal government in cer-
tain situations was established in the Halliburton Oil Well case."
Louisiana attempted to impose its use tax upon use within the state
of property purchased outside the state regardless of whether it
was use incident to ownership. The Court held that a complementary
use tax was unlawful because it discriminated against interstate com-
merce. The tax in question was imposed upon the use of material
purchased outside the state when a sales tax would not have been ap-
plicable if the material had been purchased within the state. In most
states if title passes to the federal government from the vendor, a sales
tax does not apply. Accordingly, any attempt to apply a complementary
use tax only upon the use of material purchased outside the state with
title passing directly to the Government from the vendor would be
28 Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, supra note 5; United States v. Boyd, supra
note 5.
29 Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963).
30 Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reify, 373 U.S. 64 (1963).
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discriminatory against interstate commerce. There are at least five
states that may possibly follow this practice.'
RATIONALE FOR THIS TYPE OF FEDERAL ACTIVITY
One may question the justification for the federal government's
attempts to reduce the impact of state and local taxes by resorting to
some of the aforementioned devices. Arguably, it is only by such
action that the federal government will obtain the same fair tax treat-
ment which it affords to the states under the federal tax statutes. On
sales to a state or local government, Federal Manufacturers and
Retailers Excise Taxes do not have to be paid, even though those taxes
are also of the vendor type. 32 Supplies for further manufacture are also
exempt from these federal taxes even where the final product is ex-
empt because sold to a state.' The language used by the Supreme
Court in the Phillips Chem. Co. case is frequently paraphrased to
state that it does not seem too much to ask that the state treat those
who deal with the federal government as well as the federal govern-
ment treats those with whom the states deal."
In addition, taxes currently being imposed by most states on the
sale of construction materials and equipment to construction contrac-
tors may add nearly a billion dollars to the cost of the Federal-aid
highway construction program." With up to 90% of the cost of this
highway construction program being paid by the federal government,
the action of those states taxing such a gift may be described as look-
ing the proverbial gift horse in the mouth.
Further, the past practice of some states intentionally discriminat-
ing against the federal government by imposing sales and use taxes
upon sales to the federal government and its contractors while at the
same time exempting sales to the state and political subdivisions and
their contractors, does not appear to represent a situation in which the
complaining party has so acted as to justify intervention by a court of
equity.
Of course, it is possible that elected representatives of the majority
of states that are not being subsidized by indirect taxation of the
federal government may find it distasteful for their citizens to pay
31
 These are Alabama, North Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington.
For a compilation of the applicable statutory provisions, see Wolf, State Taxation of
Government Contractors, supra note 3, at 307-423 (Appendix).
82
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §I 4055, 4221(a)(4).
33
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 4221(a)(1).
84
 See Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Independent School Dist., supra note 12, where
the Court said, at 385:
.	 [I]t does not seem too much to require that the State treat those who deal
with the Government as well as it treats those with whom it deals itself.
33 Federal Publications, The Government Contractor, If 281 (1961).
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federal taxes to subsidize a small number of other states imposing such
indirect taxes on their federal government.
In conclusion, it is clear that there are two sides to the question
of whether states should indulge in the luxury of indirectly taxing the
federal government. While such taxation may be accomplished legally,
experience indicates that by so doing, a state may imperil its attrac-
tiveness to business. It is also apparent that the federal government
possesses some rather lethal weapons in its arsenal with which to
oppose any determined tax assault by state and local governments. The
contractor appears as the unfortunate beneficiary of this dilemma,
since he must comply with the orders of the federal government al-
though it is he who bears the burden of the state tax.
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